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BRINGING UP BABY: MARYLAND MUST ADOPT AN
EQUITABLE FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING FROZEN
EMBRYO DISPUTES AFTER DIVORCE
1.

INTRODUCTION

In 2002, about sixty-two million women of reproductive age were
living in the United States. 1 Of these sixty-two million women,
roughly 10% of them sought medical advice for fertility-related
problems at some point in the past. 2 As a result of the prevalence and
success of modem assisted reproductive technology (ART)3 and in
vitro fertilization (IVF), 4 more than 48,000 children were born in
2003. 5 In addition to live births, the increased use of ART had
precipitated the storage of over 400,000 frozen embryos6 by 2003. 7

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology:
Home, http://www.cdc.gov/artiindex.htm (last visited Feb. 21,2008).
Id.
Generally,

ART procedures involve surgically removing eggs from a woman's
ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them
to the woman's body or donating them to another woman. They do NOT
include treatments in which only sperm are handled (i.e., intrauterine---or
artificial-insemination) or procedures in which a woman takes medicine
only to stimulate egg production without the intention of having eggs
retrieved.
Id. (emphasis in original).
"In vitro fertilization (IVF), [is] the oldest and most well-known of ... [ART]
technologies .... " IVF "involves medically stimulating the ovaries to produce eggs.
These eggs are then removed from the woman's ovaries where they are placed in a
culture, fertilized with sperm, incubated for several days, and then transferred into
the uterus." Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contacts and
Consents, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897,902-03 (2000).
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology
(ART)
Report:
Introduction
to
the
2003
National
Report,
http://www.cdc.gov/artiart2003/nation.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) ("The 122,872
ART cycles performed ... in 2003 resulted in ... live births [of] 48,756 infants.").
"The term 'frozen embryos' ... is the term of art denoting cryogenically-preserved
preembryos." Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, Comment, To Have Or Not To Have:
Whose Procreative Rights Prevail In Disputes Over Dispositions of Frozen
Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REv. 1377, 1377 nA (1995). In this Comment, the term
"embryo" and "preembryo" will be used interchangeably.

285

286

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 37

While the use of ART was increasing, divorce rates remained high
on both a national and local level. 8 In the United States, 3.6 million
divorces occurred during 2005. 9 In Maryland, the divorce rate was
nearly 50% in the year 2005. 10
It is a logical assumption that a portion of the stored embryos are
the result of divorced spouses who are unable to come to an
agreement regarding the disposal of or use of the frozen embryos.
The dearth of legislation and consistent judicial guidelines governing
such claims hampers resolution to the dispute of frozen embryos after
divorce. I 1 Only a handful of states have passed legislation governin~
how frozen embryos should be handled once a marriage ends. 1
Maryland is not one of these states.
Additionally, judicial approaches to settling disposition
disagreements vary widely from state to state and "are insufficient to
provide individuals and the courts with a means of regulating the
disputes." 13 One court, in an embryo disposition dispute, noted that
the ever-increasing number of cases dealing with the disposition of
frozen embryos after divorce "will unquestionably spark further
progression of the law.,,14 That court also warned that such laws
must provide "clear, consistent principles to guide parties in
protecting their interests and resolving their disputes.,,15

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.

Rick Weiss, 400,000 Human Embryos Frozen in u.s., WASH. POST, May 8, 2003, at
AI0. This estimate was based on a survey of nearly all fertility clinics located in the
United States. Id.
See MARTHA L. MUNSON & PAUL D. SUTION; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, AND DEATHS: PROVISIONAL DATA FOR
2005 6 (2006).
Id. at 1.
See id. at 6.
Nicole L. Cucci, Note, Constitutional Implications of In Vitro Fertilization
Procedures, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 417, 438-39 (1998); Kellie LaGatta, Comment,

12.

The Frozen Embryo Debate Heats Up: A Call for Federal Regulation and
Legislation, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 99, 99 (2002).
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (requiring written

13.
14.

permission from the gamete provider before using frozen embryos); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 742.17(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006) (empowering both gamete providers with
equal decision making authority over frozen embryo disposition); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9:121-9:133 (2000 & Supp. 2007) (terming frozen embryos biological
human beings that may not be intentionally destroyed); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
556(A)(1) (West 2000) (requiring written consent from both gamete providers before
allowing the transfer of frozen embryos).
LaGatta, supra note 11, at 115.
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998).

15.

Id.
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With this in mind, Maryland must enact legislation and create a fair
and consistent judicial approach to resolving embryo disputes.
Although Maryland courts have yet to see an embryo disposition
case, given the statistics of the rising instances of ART, 16 such a case
is inevitable.
This Comment will analyze current judicial trends in assisted
reproduction and their inherent gender biases. While this Comment
will not assert that anyone approach is more favorable than another,
it will offer suggestions on how to mitigate the disparate impact on
women inflicted by these current approaches. 17 It is the author's
hope that these approaches, when thoughtfully employed, will
provide a fair outcome for all parties involved in embryo disposition
disputes.
Part II will provide an overview of the most widely employed
judicial approaches to embryo disposition disputes. 18 In particular,
Part II.A will address the most prevalent theory to embryo dispute
resolution: the contractual the070; 19 Part II.B will discuss the
contemporaneous consent model; 0 and Part II.C will discuss the
balancinglbest interest test. 21
Part III of this Comment will touch briefly on the current
legislative approaches to governing embryo dispute cases,22 although
it is not the core subject of this Comment. The author feels, however,
that ultimately Maryland will have to create a legislative solution to
this dilemma, and thus an awareness of current legislative trends is
helpful.
Part IV will provide an overview of the four most common
categories of legal status applied to frozen embryos.23 Though some
analysis is provided in this section, in-depth discussion is outside the
scope of this Comment. The author believes, however, that in order
to properly address frozen embryo disputes, courts must have a
framework in place by which the legal status of the embryos can be
analyzed.
Part V will then discuss weaknesses in the most common judicial
approach, the contractual theory, and also discuss varying problems
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1377.
See infra Parts V.B-C.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part H.C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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with the balancingibest interest test. 24
Specifically, Part V.A
addresses the failure of the contractual theory to yield equitable
results. 25 Part V.B focuses on inherent gender bias in today's current
application of the balancingibest interest test. 26 Part V.C discusses
how the "right not to parent" results in unfair outcomes to women. 27
Throughout Part V, this Comment will introduce suggested
modifications to these approaches that would result in more equitable
judicial decisions.
Although this Comment focuses on the disparate effect on women
of the current judicial approaches and offers a framework more
favorable for the unique position of women in reproduction, the
author does not intend to suggest that infertile men have less of a
right to frozen embryos created by their gametes than do infertile
women. As this scenario is encountered less often in such cases,28 it
is outside the scope of this Comment.
II.

BACKGROUND

When faced with the problem of the disposition of frozen embryos
after divorce, courts have primarily relied on three approaches when
rendering their decisions: the contractual approach; the
contemporaneous mutual consent model; and the balancingibest
interest test. 29
A.

The Contractual Approach

The contractual approach asserts that any agreements entered into
at the time of ART treatment should be considered valid and binding
"so long as they do not violate public policy.,,3o By honoring
contracts entered into prior to treatment advocates argue that it
endows individuals with the power to make personal decisions, and
so keeps personal decision making outside the reach of the state or
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
See Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of "Coerced
Parenthood" in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 1021, 1061 (2004)
(arguing that when "treatment for prostate cancer or other illnesses. , . [impairs or
destroys] a man's reproductive capacity," and "a man's interest in using existing
embryos to achieve genetic parenthood is as compelling as that of the aging divorcee
who can no longer produce viable eggs").
Witten v. Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Iowa 2003).
[d. at 776 (citing Lowitz v. Lowitz, 48 P.3d 261,271 (Wash. 2002); Kass v. Kass,
696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.w.2d 588, 597 (Tenn.
1992)).

Bringing Up Baby

20081

289

the courtS. 31 This approach is considered the "currently prevailing"
form of analysis. 32 Scholarly criticism of this analysis nevertheless
exists because some argue it fails to "protect[] the individual and
societal interests at stake.,,33
1.

Case Law

a.

Roman v. Roman

Roman v. Roman,34 a case of first impression for the Texas Court
of Appeals, involved the disposition of three frozen embryos created
by the parties after many unsuccessful attempts to achieve pregnancy
by other means. 35 In this case, both the husband and wife signed an
"Informed Consent for Cryopreservation of Embryos" at the fertility
This "embryo
clinic before undergoing any procedures. 36
agreement," as the court called it, contained a clear term in which
both parties agreed to destruction of the embryos if the parties
divorced. 37
After the parties filed for divorce they participated in mediation to
resolve the issues surrounding the divorce. 38 They were successful in
all areas except for the disposition of the three frozen embryos, which
the trial court ultimately awarded to the wife. 39 The Court of
Appeals of Texas, First District, anticipating that legislation would
eventually provide an answer to the issue at hand, confined its
analysis to whether the embryos were properly awarded to the wife in
light of the written agreement. 40

31.
32.
33.

34.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

/d. at 776-77 (quoting Kass; 696 N.E.2d at 180).
Id. at 776 (citing Lowitz, 48 P.3d at 271; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; Davis, 842 S.W.2d
at 597).
Id. at 777 (quoting Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L.
REv. 55, 88-89 (1999); Christina C. Lawrence, Note, Procreative Liberty and the
Preembryo Problem: Developing a Medical and Legal Framework to Settle the
Disposition o/Frozen Preembryos, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 721, 729 (2002)).
193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006). In addition to the contractual approach model, the
court also seems to acknowledge the contemporaneous mutual consent model when it
subjects the authority of an embryo agreement contract to "mutual change of mind."
Id. at 50. The thrust of the court's analysis, however, is that "[a]bsent ambiguity, [the
court] interpret[s] a contract as a matter of law." Id.
Id. at 41-42.
/d.

Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. at 45.
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Texas law, the court noted, is rather contradictory with regard to
the issue of parenthood, consent, and ART. 41 The law requires both
the consent of the husband and wife before undergoing ART
procedures, yet concedes that "a child may be born without the
husband's consent.,,42 More importantly, the court noted, is the
absence of any legislation specifically addressing how best to
"determine the disposition of the embryos in case of a contingency
such as death or divOfce.,,43
Given the lack of legislation or case law on point, the court looked
to the state's gestational agreements and case law from other
jurisdictions for guidance. 44 In light of its findings, the court found
in favor of the husband and, hence, for the destruction of the
embryos.45
In support of its decision, the court stated that "allowing the parties
voluntarily to decide the disposition of frozen embryos in advance of
cryopreservation, subject to mutual change of mind, jointly
expressed, best serves the existing public policy" of the state of
Texas. 46
The court also refused to imply language and meaning to the
contract that was not already within its four comers;47 the court thus
did not take into consideration that a party's decision to sign an
agreement was not "fully considered" at the time it was signed. 48
Rather, the court focused on the clarity of the language of the embryo
agreement 49 and, embracing the mantra of the Kass court, asserted
that such agreements "should thus be gresumed valid and should be
enforced as between the progenitors. '"
b.

Kass v. Kass

In Kass v. Kass,51 the Court of Appeals of New York ruled on the
disposition of five embryos created during a marriage. 52 After the
marriage ended in divorce, the wife claimed that the embryos were
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 49.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 49-50.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 50 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); Kass v. Kass,
696 N.E.2d 174,180 (N.Y. 1998».
696N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 175.
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"her only chance for genetic motherhood. ,,53 In contrast, the husband
argued that use of the embryos would impose upon him the "burdens
of unwanted fatherhood.,,54 Additionally, the husband asserted that
the parties had agreed, in the event of the couple's divorce, that the
embryos would be donated to the IVF program for research
purposes. 55
Before cryopreservation of the embryos occurred, the couple
signed several forms relating to disposition of the embryos, including
a statement which read: "In the event of divorce, we understand that
legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a
property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a
court of competent jurisdiction. ,,56
The New York State Supreme Court awarded custody to the wife
after determining that the wife, as a female, has "exclusive decisional
authori~ over the fertilized eggs" just as she would over a "nonviable
fetus." 5 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second
Department, however, reversed this decision, holding that a woman's
bodily integrity was not implicated prior to implantation and that the
parties had a valid agreement regarding the disposition of the
embryos. 58 As a result, the appellate division held that this
agreement should govern. 59
The Court of Appeals of New York agreed with the appellate
division and clearly affirmed its decision that "a woman's right of
privacy or bodily integrity" are not implicated "in the area of
reproductive choice.,,6o
The court's analysis focused more on the agreement that had been
signed by the parties prior to the divorce and less on any implications
the decision may have had with regard to rights of privacy and bodily

53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

ld.
ld.
!d.
ld. at 176; see also id. at 175 n.1 (defining eggs that are fertilized but do not yet
contain the genetic material from the sperm as pre-zygotes).
ld. at 177.
ld.
!d.
ld. at 179. The court also quickly dispensed with any argument that the frozen
embryos were entitled to Constitutional protection, emphasizing that the embryos
were not "recognized as 'persons' for constitutional purposes." ld. (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (1973) (indicating that "unborn [children] have never
been recognized in the law as . . . whole" persons, and thus are not afforded all
constitutional protections)).
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integrity.61 The court held that disposition agreements such as the
one at issue between Mr. and Mrs. Kass should "generally be
presumed valid and binding" and completely enforceable in any
·
62
eventua I dIspute.
The court noted the importance of encouraging the involved parties
to clearly think through all possible contingencies before signing
disposition agreements but acknowledged "the extraordinary
difficult?," in fully understanding the implications of unknown future
events. 6 Regardless of a party's inability to foresee events related to
marriage and disposition, the Court of Appeals of New York held that
where parties have "clearly manifested their intention, the law will
honor it.,,64
B.

The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Model

The contemporaneous mutual consent model is similar to the
contractual approach in that it asserts that parties who contribute
frozen embryos should make decisions regarding the disposition of
those embryos, and each party is entitled to "an equal say in how the
embryos should be disposed.,,65
In a manner different from the contractual theory, however, this
approach gives substantial weight to the idea that people are likely to
change their minds about disposition after the embryos have been
frozen. 66 It is thus "impossible" to expect a person to make a rational
and binding choice prior to freezing the embryos. 67 This approach
acknowledges that the decisions regarding disposition have "lifelong
consequences for a person's identity and sense of self.,,68 This model
therefore suggests that parties may only use, donate, or destroy the

61.
62.

63.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id. at 179-80.
Id. at 180 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (holding "that an
agreement regarding disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of
contingencies ... should be presumed valid" and enforceable); John A. Robertston,
In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 463-69
(1990) (analyzing the implications and enforceability of joint directives for the
disposition of embryos».
Id. The court additionally noted that the parties' wishes regarding disposition of the
embryos, as expressed prior to the eruption of a dispute, should always be
"uppermost in the analysis" of disposition disagreements. Id. The court also stated
that if such agreements are only enforceable while parties continue to agree, then
they become ineffectual. See id.
Id. at 182.
Witten v. Witten, 672 NW.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003).
Id. at 777-78.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 778.
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embryos if both parties agree. 69 As a result, agreements into which
parties enter prior to the creation of the embryos are not binding. 70
1.

Case Law

a.

A.Z. v. B.Z.

In A.Z. v. B.Z. 71 the parties attempted to conceive naturally shortly
after marriage. 7i After the wife suffered an ectopic pregnancy and
underwent the removal of her left fallopian tube,73 however, the
couple sought fertility treatment in order to become pregnant. 74
Eventually the couple succeeded, and the wife gave birth to twin
daughters. 75 During the final fertilization attempt, several excess
embryos were not imllanted in the wife's womb and were frozen for
potential future use. 7
When the couple filed for divorce several years later, the excess
frozen embryos became the subject of dispute. 77 Before each
treatment, the couple had signed numerous consent forms re~arding
the disposition of the embryos in case of death or divorce.
The
wife modified the initial form to state that she, upon separation,
would retain the rights to the frozen embryos.79 The husband signed
this consent form as well. 80 Subsequent consent forms, however,
were blank when signed by the husband and then modified later by
the wife to read exactly as the initial consent form read, which
granted the wife custody of any frozen embryos. 81
The court noted that this case was the first in which an embryo
agreement granted one party the right to use the embryos for personal
implantation. 82 The court, however, doubted the enforceability of the
agreement for several reasons: the lack of evidence showing that the
69.

70.
71.
72.

73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

[d.
ld.
72SN.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
[d. at 1052.
!d. "An ectopic pregnancy is one that occurs outside the uterus, the normal locus of
pregnancy." ld. at 1052 n.6 (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 488 (25th ed.
1990».
[d. at 1052.
[d. at 1053.
[d.
See id. at 1052-53.
See id. at 1053-54.
[d. at 1054.
ld.
[d.
ld. at 1056.
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couple intended the consent fonn to be a binding agreement; the
change in circumstances created by the birth of their daughters; and
the lack of clarity in the meaning of the words "become separated"
used in the consent fonn. 83
Even if the consent fonn had been unambiguous, however, the
court stated that it would still refuse to enforce such an agreement
based on public policy.84 The court stated:
[W]e conclude that, even had the husband and the wife
entered into an unambiguous agreement between themselves
regarding the disposition of the frozen preembryos, we
would not enforce an agreement that would compel one
donor to become a parent against his or her will. As a
matter of public policy, we conclude that forced procreation
is not an area amenable to judicial enforcement. It is wellestablished that courts will not enforce contracts that violate
public policy. 85
In order to detennine public policy, the court turned to legislation
for guidance. 86 It noted that Massachusetts legislation barred
contracts forcing people into familial relationships-a parent/child
relationship, even absent an emotional bond, is one such
relationship. 87 In sum, the court stated that to force the unwilling
husband into fatherhood would not be "an area amenable to judicial
enforcement. ,,88
C.

The Balancing/Best Interest Test

The balancing or best interest test weighs the interests of both
parties, while rejecting the necessity of mutual consent and
contractual enforcement. 89 This approach asserts that where parties
are in disagreement as to the disposition of frozen embryos, courts

83.
84.
85.

86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 1056-57.
Id. at 1057-58.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc., 118 F.3d
841, 84~5 (1 st Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by E. Associated Coal
Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 61 (2000); Beacon Hill Civic
Ass'n v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 662 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Mass. 1996);
Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 320 N.E.2d 911, 915 (Mass. 1974».
Id. at 1058.
See id. at 1058-59.
Id. at 1057-58.
See Witten v. Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Iowa 2003) (citing I.B. v. M.B., 783
A.2d 707, 718-19 (N.J. 2001».
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are to look at the parties individually and evaluate each party's own
interest in either the preservation or destruction of the embryos. 90
1.

Case Law

a.

J.B. v. M.B.

In JB. v. M.B.,91 a married couple learned that the wife had a
condition that would make it difficult for her to conceive.92 The
couple sought medical treatment and successfully conceived a child
after in vitro fertilization. 93 The facility that conducted the treatment
required the husband and wife to sign a consent form prior to
treatment, 94 The form stated that, in the event of divorce, "all
control, direction, and ownership" of the resulting embryos would
belong to the fertility clinic unless otherwise determined by a court
order."95
Upon separation, the couple had seven embryos in storage at the
fertility clinic. 96 Consequently, the wife sought a court order from
the Supreme Court of New Jersey requiring that the embryos be
destroyed, arguing that she had "endured the in vitro [fertilizationJ
process" in order to use them "in the context of an intact family.,,9
The husband filed a counterclaim requesting that the court allow the
embryos to be donated to other infertile couples. 98
The parties offered very different bases for their claims. 99 The
husband asserted that the destruction of the embryos "violated his
constitutional rights to procreation and the care and companionship
of his children." 100 He argued that these constitutional rights
outweighed his wife's "right not to procreate because her right to
bodily integrity [was] not implicated." 101 Conversely, the wife
argued that New Jersey public policy prevented forcing individuals
into familial relationships. 102

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. (citingJ.B., 783 A.2d at 719).
783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
Id. at 709.
!d. at 709-10.
Id.
[d. at 710.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 712.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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While the court found that the si¥ned consent fonn did not clarify
the original intent of the parties,IO it noted that the "thrust" of the
agreement was that the fertility clinic "obtains control over the
pre embryos unless the parties choose otherwise in writing, or unless a
court specifically directs otherwise.,,104 Because there was no
separate writing memorializing the parties' intentions, the court
found that it was within its own jurisdiction to detennine the fate of
the embryos. 105
The court acknowledged the novelty and complexity of the case,
noting that medical advancements in ART have outpaced legal
advancements on the issue. 106 Likewise, it recognized that at the
time parties enter into embryo agreements, a couple is unlikely to
anticipate the possibility of divorce. 107 The court further stated that
both parties provide necessary biological material for the creation of
the embryos and, as such, decisions regarding disposition should be
made jointly. 108
To reach its decision in favor of the wife's request to destroy the
embryos, the court noted that the husband's ability to procreate was
not limited by the destruction of the embryos because his fertility was
not impaired; his constitutional rights were thus spared. 109
Conversely, the wife's right not to procreate might be lost through
donation of the embryos, as she would be forced to become a
biological mother against her will. 110 The court refused to saddle the
wife with the burden of knowing she might have biological children
living without her knowledge, if the embryos were donated. III
Although the court acknowledged the arguments for enforcing
embryo agreements, it felt that the "better rule" was to allow such
agreements to be subject to change. 112 The court focused on the
103.
104.
105.
106.. -

Id. at 713.
Id.
See id. at 714-15.
See id. at 715. The court stated that "there are few guideposts for decision-making.
Advances in medical technology have far outstripped the development of legal
principles to resolve the inevitable disputes arising out of the new reproductive
opportunities now available." Id.

107.
108.

Id.

109.
110.
III.
112.

See id. (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,597 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that both
members of a couple have an interest in the disposition of their embryos); Coleman,
supra note 33, at 83 (arguing that both the male and female donor'should have
mutual decision-making authority over embryo's disposition)).
Id. at 717.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 719 (stating that either party should be allowed to change his or her mind up
until the destruction or implantation of the frozen embryos).
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public policy of limitations on contracts involving family
relationships and argued that public policy would be furthered by
allowing a party to back out of a decision regarding future embryo
use. 113 The court noted that, although the courts consider them
conditional, most embryo agreements will govern so that clinics and
parties would be able to rely on the enforcement of their terms. 114
The court specifically refused to address the issue of how a claim
would be resolved if an infertile party wanted, against the wishes of
his or her partner, to use frozen embryos in order to become a
biological parent.I IS
b.

Davis v. Davis

The balancinglbest interest test was clearly illustrated in Davis v.
Davis." 6 In Davis, upon the dissolution of their marriage, the parties
were unable to agree on the disposition of seven frozen embryos
After the trial court granted
created during the marriage. I17
"custody" to the wife, Mary Sue, on the basis that the embryos were
human bein~s and could not be destroyed, the husband, Junior Lewis,
The intermediate appellate court overruled the trial
appealed. II
court and stated that there was "no compelling state interest" in
forcing parenthood on an unwilling partner, and as a result, the
parties should have joint control. I19 Mary Sue sought review by the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, which granted certiorari, not because it
disagreed with the decision of the appellate court, "but because of the
obvious importance of the case in terms of the development of law
regarding the new reproductive technologies, and because the
decision of the Court of Appeals [of Tennessee] does not give
adequate guidance to the trial court in the event the parties cannot
agree." 120
Although the Davis court stated that embryo agreements into which
parties enter should be "presumed valid," it simultaneously
113.
114.
115.
116.

117.
118.
119.
120.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 720.

842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). The Supreme Court of Tennessee balanced the
parties' interests by considering "the positions of the parties, the significance of their
interests, and the relative burdens that will be imposed by differing resolutions." Id.
at 603, The Davis case also addressed whether frozen embryos are persons or
property. ld. at 594-97. This secondary issue is beyond the scope of this ~omment.
!d. at 589.
ld.
[d.
Id. at 590.
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acknowledged that such agreements are so emotionally charged that
they are nearly impossible to enter into with truly informed
consent. 121 The court also briefly acknowledged that in some
situations, estoppel by the pa~ wishing to utilize the frozen embryos
may be a plausible argument. I 2
Ultimately, the court found that the resolution to the instant
problem "tumI ed] on the parties' exercise of their constitutional right
to privacy.,,12 The Davis court noted that the u.s. Supreme Court
had implied this right to decide "whether to bear or beget a child.,,124
Using this approach for the instant case, the court looked at the
balance between the parties' rights to have children and their rights
not to have children. 125
The court then stated that in vitro
fertilization was a scenario ripe with "inherent tension" between
these two rights. 126
The Davis court, although it acknowledged that the wife was
affected to a much a greater extent than her husband by the IVF
process, refused to afford her greater influence over the fate of the
embryos than that of her husband. 127 The court reasoned that the
parties should be viewed in light of the possibility of their potential
parenthood-both the happiness it involves for the party who desires
it, and the burden it imposes for the party who does not. 128 Under
this approach, the court felt the farties should be viewed "as entirely
equivalent gamete-providers.,,12
The Davis court also noted that not only were the parties' decisions
regarding procreation immune from outside interference, but that
Tennessee's interest in encouraging procreation was not sufficient to
override an individual's choices regarding procreation. l3O
Ultimately, the court embraced a balancing approach to determine
whose rights should prevail. 131 The court looked at whether the wife
should prevail in her desire to procreate or whether the husband

121.
122.
123.
124.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

[d. at 597.
See id. at 598.
[d.

[d. at 600 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)); see also Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (recognizing that "[t]he decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child is ... [a] constitutionally protected choice[],').
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
[d.

[d.
Jd.
Jd.
[d. at 602.
/d. at 603.
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should be allowed to avoid unwanted procreation. 132 To determine
whose interest was greater, the court addressed the possible burdens
imposed on the husband should he become a father. 133 The court
listed possible burdens imposed on the husband, which included: the
psychological results of unwanted fatherhood stemming from the
divorce of his parents and the financial burdens of caring for a
child. 134 Additionally, the court pointed out that if the embryos were
used by another infertile couple, the husband would spend his life
wondering if he was a biological parent. 135 The court felt that the
resulting situation would defeat the husband's "procreational
autonomy" and bar him from developing a relationship with any
subsequent children. 136
On the other hand, the court only realized one burden imposed on
the wife-if the wife were unable to prevail in her desire to donate
the pre-embryo to another infertile couple, she would only face the
knowledge that the extensive IVF treatment she underwent had been
for naught. 137 The court noted, however, that if the wife had been
seeking the pre-embryos for her own personal use, and she were
unable to become a parent by other "reasonable means," then the
outcome of this case would have been less clear. 138
III. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES
A.

Current Trends in Legislation

The existence of state legislation governing embryo disposition
disputes is sparse. 139 Even those states that have legislation in place,
with regard to embryo disposition agreements, avoid establishing the
validity and enforceability of such agreements; 140 current legislation
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
141.

Id.
Id.
!d. at 603-04.
!d. at 604.
!d.
Id.
Id.
See LaGatta, supra note II, at 107-08.
Id. The article notes that as of 2002, "only six states-Florida, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania-[had] legislation specifically
attempting to resolve the problems associated with IVF." Id. at 108; see also FLA.
STAT. § 742.17 (2005 & Supp. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (2002); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:122-133 (2000 &
Supp. 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-8:13-15 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp.
2007)); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3212(e), 3216(c) (West 2000). At that time,
Florida and New Hampshire required parties seeking IVF treatment to sign
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fails to address the rights of parties involved in embryo disposition
·
141
dlsputes.
Another weakness in state legislation regarding embryo disposition
is that the laws vary greatly from state to state. 142 This results in
increasing "difficulty in determining the rights to frozen embryos and
determining the enforceability of agreements concerning the
disposition of unused embryos.,,143 As a result of such legislative
inconsistencies, some scholars call for a "[f1ederal uniform Rolicy"
with regard to the disposition of frozen embryos after divorce. 44
Moreover, some state laws regarding embryo disposition implicate
larger issues, such as the question of when life begins. 14
For
example, "Louisiana law adamantly prohibits the destruction of
viable embryos because the legislature considers the embryos to be
human beings.,,146 Similarly, "Kentucky ... [has enacted laws]
prohibit[ing] the intentional destruction of an embryo.,,147 Critics of
IVF-related legislation assert that "[f1etal personhood" laws deprive
women of equality in the eyes of the law. 148 As a result, feminist
critics of personhood laws worry that rights are being taken "away

141.

142.
143.

145.

145.
146.
147.
148.

disposition forms. Id. at 109; see also FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2005 & Supp. 2006);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:21 (LexisNexis 2001).
LaGatta, supra note 11, at 108; see also FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2005 & Supp. 2006);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (2002); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (West 2006);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:122-133 (2000 & Supp. 2007); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
168-B:13-15 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3212(e),
3216(c) (West 2000).
LaGatta, supra note 11, at 108.
Id.; see also Elizabeth A. Trainor, Annotation, Right of Husband, Wife, or Other
Party to Custody of Frozen Embryo, Pre-embryo, or Pre-zygote in Event of Divorce,
Death or Other Circumstances, 87 A.L.R. 5th 253,261 (2001) (discussing the birth
oflaw that can be used to determine the enforceability of embryo agreements).
LaGatta, supra note 11, at Ill. Author, Kellie LaGatta, asserts that a federal
regulation governing the disposition of frozen embryos in dispute would "help to
prevent [and resolve] later disagreements without interfering with fundamental rights
of reproductive autonomy." Id. at 112.
See id. at 108; see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123-133 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
LaGatta, supra note 11, at 109; see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:122-133 (2000 &
Supp. 2007).
LaGatta, supra note 11, at 108; see also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (West
2006).
Lisa McLennan Brown, Feminist Theory and the Erosion of Women's Reproductive
Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and In Vitro Fertilization, 13
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 87, 103-04 (2005).
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from women in the reproductive choice arena, instead of increasing
joint decision-making." 149
Proponents of federal legislation argue that increased joint
decision-making will be overcome by "careful legislation." 150 This
legislation, scholars assert, should require counseling prior to
undergoing IVF treatment; such a requirement would force "parties
to seriously think" about the repercussions of their decisions. 151
Arguably, such legislation would encourage shared decision-making
over the fate of the embryos, thus equalizing the power of the
parties. 152
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF FROZEN EMBRYOS

A.

Current Approaches to Classifying the Legal Status of Frozen
Embryos

Before a court tackles the problem of who should have control over
the disposition of frozen embryos after divorce, it is imperative that
the court determine under which legal "classification" the embryos
fall. IS3 There are four such classifications that have been developed:
the "right-to-life" approach; the "current constitutional view of the
Supreme Court"~ the "special respect" approach; and the "private
property view." I 4
The right-to-life classification is the most restrictive of the
classifications concerning the rights of progenitors, and it endows the
embryo its own set of "full rights and protections." I 55 This ,}?proach
has sparked concern and criticism from feminist scholars. 15 These
critics worry that by endowing embryos with personhood rights, the
149.

ISO.
lSI.
153.

153.
154.
ISS.

156.

Id. at 104. The author further notes that "legislation ... enacted so far consistently
has regulated the actions of women and reinforced the status quo instead of
undermining it." Id.
LaGatta, supra note II, at 113.
Id.atI14.
Id. The author also notes that "subjective judicial discretion" would be solved by
federal legislation and advocates following the lead of other nations, such as
Australia and the United Kingdom, which have enacted such laws. Id. at liS.
Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1382.
Jd. at 1382-83. The "current constitutional view of the Supreme Court" is
encompassed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1382 (quoting Jennifer L. Carow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An
Inconsistent Exception to an Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational
Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 523,538 (1994». The
author also notes that this stance is currently embraced by the Roman Catholic
Church. Id. at 1382 n.41.
See Brown, supra note 148, at 91-92.

302

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 37

liberty interests gained by women in Roe v. Wade are severely
undermined. 157
The current constitutional view of the Supreme Court, on the other
hand, does not view an embryo as a legal person. 158 The effect of
this view is that a fetus is not afforded rights until it has undergone a
live birth. 159 By extension, "frozen preembryo[s] must [also] fall
short of the Supreme Court's definition ofa 'person.",160
The special respect classification takes into consideration the
possibility that a frozen embryo may eventually develop into a human
being. 161 Advocates of a special respect approach believe embryos
are imbued with a "unique moral significance" that acts to remind us
of the "unique gift of human existence." 162 Proponents of this
classification argue that, because embryos cannot process emotion
and thought, they are not individuals, and thus, embryos are not
persons to be afforded the full protection such legal status would
offer. 163 Critics argue, however, that a special respect framework
could become "a slippery slope where preembryos and other
nonviable entities consisting of human genetic material" obtain rights
that outweigh those of the gamete providers. 164
The private property approach focuses not on the embryo itself, but
rather it looks to see which party may "have 'rights' or 'property'
interests in them." 165 To determine those rights and interests,
proponents of this classification give great weight to the procreational

157.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

164.

165.

Id. at 91. For example, Louisiana state law defines "an in vitro fertilized human
ovum [as] a biological human being" and specifically rejects the argument that frozen
embryos are property. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9: 126 (2000). The law also states that
identified gamete providers retain all rights as parents of the fertilized ovum, but if
the gamete providers "fail to express their identity," then the embryos must be
protected until "adoptive implantation can occur" in order to "protect the in vitro
fertilized human ovum's rights." Id.
Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1383. This is the approach currently held by the United
States Supreme Court. Id.
Jd. (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-62).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting John Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos,
76 VA. L. REv. 437, 447 (1990».
See id. at 1383-84. The author also notes that the special respect approach has
gained the most popularity and support both internationally and in the United States.
Jd. at 1384.
Fotini Antonia Skouvakis, Comment, Defining the Undefined: Using a Best Interests
Approach to Decide the Fate of Cryopreserved Preembryos in Pennsylvania, 109
PENN. ST. L. REV. 885, 892 (2005).
Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1384.
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rights of the gamete providers. 166 Additionally, this approach instills
equal rights in gamete providers because the embryos are not yet
implanted in a woman's body; the private pro~erty approach,
therefore fails to implicate bodily integrity issues. 1 7 The "private
property" approach has been criticized for its classification of frozen
embryos as mere chattel and for failing to provide any legal
protection to the embryos. 168
The importance of establishing a consistent judicial classification
for frozen embryos is illustrated by Davis v. Davis. 169 The Davis
dispute was heard in three levels of the court system in Tennessee,
and each court used "an entirely different legal analysis" to determine
the status of the embryos.170 The result was that each court reached a
different outcome: the trial court labeled the embryos '''children, in
vitro' and awarded custody of them to the mother"; the court of
appeals suggested the embryos were property and granted joint
custody; and the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the embryos
were "neither persons nor property, but rather entitled to 'special
respect. '" 171
V. ANALYSIS
A.

Debunking the Myth of Fairness in the Contractual Theory

Although the contractual theory appears to be a favorite among
courts today,172 it arguably fails to yield equitable results in embryo
dispute cases. The reasons for this potential inequity are myriad:
first, parties rarely can fully appreciate the impact of their decisions
when the agreements are signed, given the highly emotional
circumstances of the agreement; 173 second, parties rarely anticipate
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

171.
172.

173.

Id.; see also York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (upholding an
embryo disposition agreement which called the frozen embryos "property").
Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1385.
Skouvakis, supra note 164, at 891.
842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992).
Vincent F. Stempel, Procreative Rights in Assisted Reproductive Technology: Why
the Angst?, 62 ALB. L. REV., 1187, 1192 (1999).
/d. at 1192-93.
See Witten v. Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 776 (Iowa 2003). As of 2000, the only state
to endorse contractual ordering for the disposition of embryos was Florida. Florida,
however, does not dictate the form or substance of such agreements. Brown, supra
note 148, at 105; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2005).
See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715 (N.J. 2001); see also Christi D. Ahnen,
Comment, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and How Do We
Decide?-An Analysis o/Davis v. Davis, York v. Jones, and State Statutes Affecting
Reproductive Choices, 24 CREIGHTONL. REV. 1299, 1346 (1991).
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that their marriages will end in divorce; 174 and third, although
embryo agreements may be presumed valid, such agreements are
often complex and unclear. 175 The following analysis will focus on
the first and third reasons.
Few anticipate that they will be faced with infertility issues, and
when one encounters them, there is little in the way of preparation for
the roller coaster ride of emotions one experiences. 176 Patients often
feel as if they lack control of their lives or as if they are failures;
depression rates are high and marital troubles sometimes develop in
these situations. l77 Often, infertile women seek treatment "at all
costs" with total disregard for the ultimate price they may pay
emotionally, physically, and financially. 178 Given these facts, the
notion that a person could enter into an embf1;o agreement with a full
appreciation of its effects is highly doubtful. I 9
There are also difficulties inherent in obtaining informed consent
from patients in the substantive form of embryo agreements. 180 For
example, although such agreements were originally intended to
inform patients of potential outcomes of the medical procedures in
which they were to undergo, the actual result has been one in which
patients simply sWn a form that "overstates the patient's exercise of
conscious Will.,,1
Medical forms such as embryo agreements are
often filled with incomprehensible medical and legal language and
are presented to patients for their signature without attempts to
engage the patients in "thoughtful deliberation and dialogue.,,182
Again, under these circumstances, it appears to be nearly impossible
for a patient to be truly informed about his or her decisions.
174.
175.

176.
177.
178.
179.

180.
181.

182.

J.B., 783 A.2d at 715.
Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process:
Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. &
MED. 455, 469-70 (1999).
See Waldman, supra note 4, at 923.
See id.
Id.
New Hampshire stands alone in that its legislation regarding the disposition of
embryos rcquires gamete donors to undergo counseling before beginning the IVF
process. The law requires "judicial preauthorization" for the approval of disposition
agreements. See Brown, supra note 148, at 105; see also LaGatta, supra note 11, at
109.
Waldman, supra note 4, at 924-25.
See id. at 920-21; see also Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE
L.J. 899, 933 (1994) (arguing that "the usefulness of informed consent depends on a
meaningful dialogue between physician and patient," although "the minimally
necessary ingredients of such a dialogue . . . are usually absent in most clinical
situations").
See Waldman, supra note 4, at 921.
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When such contracts or embryo agreements are entered into, a
court's decision to enforce them is arguably unconscionable. 183 This
is not only the result of the fragile emotional and p~sical state of the
patient at the time the agreement is entered into, I 4 and the murky
language within the document,185 but it also results from the general
disparity in the reproductive abilities of the parties. 186 Women are
most often the infertile patient and are most often the party who finds
herself "in the twilight of her reproductive years" without a viable
option for postponing biological parenthood. 187 Men, on the other
hand, are often able to reproduce well into their seventh decade. 188
Disparity in bargaining power may arise because a woman might feel
she has no other option than to sign an embryo agreement, in light of
her limited reproductive window, even if the terms of the agreement
are contrary to her true wishes. 189
The family law section of the American Bar Association first
recognized the tremendous psychological effect of infertility in 1999
in its publication of a projosed Assisted Reproductive Technologies
In a section devoted entirely to the
Model Act (the Act).19
psychological effects of ART, the authors of the Act address the need
for in-depth psychological counseling by qualified medical personnel
before a patient and her partner enter into any embryo agreement. 191
The purpose of requiring such extensive psychological support for
patients is to bolster the embryo agreements into which these patients
may eventually enter. 192 Specifically, the authors of the Act state that

183.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

191.

192.

See id. at 926. Critics have also called automatic enforcement of such contracts not
"entirely sensible" given the added complexity of "contract ambiguity, changed
circumstances and public policy responses to contracts surrounding reproduction."
See Daar, supra note 177, at 469.
See Waldman, supra note 4, at 922-24.
Id. at 921.
See id. at 928.
Id.
Waldman, supra note 28, at 1061.
See Waldman, supra note 4, at 926--28; Coleman, supra note 33, at 97-101.
See AMI S. JAEGER ET AL., ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES
COMMITTEE, FAMILY LAW SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES MODEL ACT 10 (1999), http://www .abanet.org/
family/committees/ART_modelact 1299 .pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2007).
Id. at 23. The Act states that patients should be counseled by medical personnel who
have qualifications including a "graduate degree in a mental health profession; ...
training in the medical and psychological aspects of infertility; ... [and a] minimum
of one year experience in infertility counseling." Id.
Id. at 23, 25.
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counseling "provides a template to ensure informed consent for legal
agreements." 193
The contractual theory also raises an additional problem. Courts
that have addressed embryo agreements in disposition cases have
generally used two very different approaches. Courts have either
enforced the contract as valid (generally where the agreement has
been to dispose of the embryos) or refused to enforce embryo
agreements where the agreement permits the use of the embryos by
one party while the other party wishes to see the embryos
destroyed. 194
This dichotomy of the nationwide judicial approaches to
contractual ordering becomes evident when the decision in A.Z. v.
B.Z. is viewed in light of Kass v. Kass and Roman v. Roman. In all
three cases, the parties had signed embryo agreements that clearly
stated the respective parties' wishes with regards to the disgosition of
any unused frozen embryos in the case of death or divorce. 95
A.Z. is factually distinguishable, however, from the other cases, in
that the A.Z. embryo agreement awarded custody of the embryos to
the wife in case of divorce,l96 whereas the other cases involved
agreements consenting to the destruction of the embryos. 197 In A.Z.,
the court refused to honor the agreement, whereas in the latter cases,
the courts enforced the agreements. 198
These differing outcomes suggest that, although, courts have
historically asserted that legally binding embryo agreements should
govern, courts do not consistently enforce such agreements. This
phenomenon causes parties to perceive that embryo agreements are
ineffectual and that courts will not always honor their contractual
wishes. 199

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 23.
Waldman, supra note 4, at 899; AZ. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-58 (Mass.
2000).
A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1051; Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174,176 (N.Y. 1998); Roman v.
Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40,42 (Tex. App. 2006).
A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054.
Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 42.
A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 50.
See Skouvakis, supra note 164, at 889. One reason courts may be hesitant to refuse
enforcement of an embryo disposition agreement is that the court would be required
to then decide the legal status of the embryo. "Case law and state legislation have
developed three legal status categories of preembryos: (I) life; (2) property; and (3)
something in between deserving special respect." !d. Each category offers unique
judicial challenges wrought with moral, ethical, and legal implications that
complicate an embryo agreement analysis. Id.
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The proposed Act of the American Bar Association offers a
different solution to cases of divorce where partners differ in their
desires regarding the disposition of their frozen embryos.200 The Act
proposes that if the parties agreed to implantation of embryos prior to
the divorce or separation (in the event of non-married gamete
providers), the party who wishes to use the embryos ma~ do so
without the unwilling partner being viewed as a legal parent. 01 This
approach would permit the infertile patient to pursue biological
parenthood without implicating the former partner's wish to avoid
parenthood.
In evaluating embryo agreements, courts have also considered
public policy; for example, finding all contracts creating familial
relationships void. 202 Regardless of the courts' varied approaches, no
court has considered the extreme hardship that is placed on the
woman undergoing fertility treatment when evaluating embryo
agreements. 203 Some feminist scholars argue that the result is unfair
enrichment to the male gamete provider, who bears little burden in
the production of the embryos, yet retains most of the control. 204
Courts generally have denied this "sweat equity" argument and
instead have chosen to view male and female rcarticipants in ART as
equals in the production of the embryos. 05 This is because
opponents argue that:
Although a woman's physical contribution to the creation
of an embryo may be greater than that of a man, it is
undertaken voluntarily and without assurances of ever
successfully becoming pregnant. Moreover, "the burdens of
unwanted genetic parenthood will last a lifetime. As such,
they will greatly outweigh either partner's short-term
physical investment at the time the embryos were initially
created. ,,206

200.
201.
202.

203.
204.
205.
206.

ART MODEL ACT, supra note 190, at 41.
Id.
Tracey S. Pachrnan, Disputes Over Frozen Preembryos & the "Right Not to Be a
Parent," 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128, 132 (2003).
Id. at 151-52.
See id. at 152.
See Fazila Issa, Note, To Dispose or Not to Dispose: Questioning the Fate of Frozen
Preembryos After a Divorce in J.B. v. M.B., 39 Hous. L. REv. 1549, 1581 (2003).
Kimberly Berg, Note, Special Respect: For Embryos and Progenitors. 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 506,527 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Coleman, supra note 33,
at 86).
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Additional criticism may exist for the sweat equity theory because
it always allows the woman to prevail, even if the male partner is the
infertile patient. 207 It may be useful, therefore, to consider the female
partner's sweat equity only if she is the infertile patient and would
potentially be forced to endure further ART procedures if the existing
embryos were destroyed.
B.

The Inherent Bias Against Women and Infertile Persons in the
Courts' Current Approach to Embryo Disposition

When faced with determining the fate of frozen embryos after
divorce, courts generally have concluded that the right to avoid
procreation outweighs the right to biological parenthood. 208 The
general result of this approach has been disparate in that the male
litigant has grevailed in destroying the embryos in four out of five
such cases. 2 9
The Davis court, for example, admitted that had Ms. Davis wished
to use the embryos for herself, the case would have been "closer" and
ultimately stated that Ms. Davis still had the right to achieve
parenthood through adoption. 210 Additionally, the court further
qualified Ms. Davis's rights to the embryos by stating that the case
would only be close if she could not become a mother by "any other
reasonable means.,,211
One problem with the Davis court's analysis is its failure to define
reasonable means,212 although the court suggests that adoption may
be one such reasonable option for Ms. Davis to achieve
parenthood. 213 The problem with the suggestion of adoption as a
panacea to a party's inability to experience parenthood is its failure to
account for the challenges that a single person who attempts to adopt
might face. 214 For example, many adoption agencies have guidelines
excluding applicants based on age, marital status, and income. 215 As
a resul~ most single, older women are unable to adopt a healthy
child. 21
Because of these barriers, adoption is often not a
207.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Shan a Kaplan, Note, From A To Z: Analysis of Massachusetts' Approach to the
Enforceability of Cryopreserved Pre-Embryo Dispositional Agreements, 81 B.U. L.
REv. 1093, 1114 (2001).
See Pachman, supra note 202, at 132.
Id. at 133.
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.w.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
Id.
See id.
Id.

See Waldman, supra note 28, at 1056.
Id. at 1058.
See id. at 1056-57.
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"comparable alternative" to allowing a woman the use of her own
embryos.217
Courts also appear to disregard the considerably greater investment
female litigants have in the ART process. 218 Rather, the courts
appear to simply assume that adoption or further infertility treatment
is a suitable alternative to a woman's use of the frozen embryos.219
The ART process, however, poses greater risks to the health of the
women who undergo it, as opposed to men, whose participation
requires little in the way of sacrifice. 22o Also, women's fertility
begins to decline as early as their twenties, so that by the time a
marriage is dissolved, the female litigant's ability to reproduce is
likely severely impaired. 221 Conversely, men generally produce
motile sperm well into their seventh decade. 222
When courts ignore the biological differences between men and
women and refuse to include them when balancing the interests of the
parties, the ultimate result is gender discrimination. 223 Some courts
attempt to protect themselves from this accusation by citing rights to
privacy and avowing the protection of personal privacy. 224
Alternatively, some courts have argued that because a frozen embryo
is not incorporated into a human body, neither reproductive nor
privacy rights are involved. 225 Regardless of a court's reasoning for
setting aside the biological differences of the gamete providers, the
result is that the courts ignore the vital fact that parties do not view
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219.
220.

221.
222.

223.
224.

225.

ld. at 1059. The author also states that the "[j]udicial affinity for this 'solution'
reveals both insensitivity to the frozen embryo litigants' parental aspirations and a
profound inattention to the real-world barriers that threaten their fulfillment." ld.
ld. at 1052.
ld.
ld. at 1052-53 (arguing that women face a "more arduous" process because "[a]1I
that is required [of men] is a private room, an empty jar and, perhaps, a Playboy
magazine or video.").
See id. at 1054-55.
/d. at 1061. If a man is unable to reproduce biologically because of illness such as
prostate cancer, his right to frozen preembryos is "as compelling as that of the aging
divorcee who can no longer produce viable eggs." ld.
Pachman, supra note 202, at 146-47.
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598-600 (Tenn. 1992). In the Davis case, for
example, the court wrote extensively on the importance of personal autonomy as a
fundamental human right as expressed in both federal and state law. See id. The
court focused specifically on procreational autonomy and acknowledged that
although it is "inherent in our most basic concepts of liberty," its protection under
federal law is "no longer entirely clear." ld. at 60 I.
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 177, 179 (N.Y. 1998).
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procreation in the same light, and therefore, do not have an "equal
interest in the disposition of their frozen embryos.,,226
Another ramification of the failure to allow for biological
differences is that infertile women suffer the most dramatic
impact. 227 It appears that courts feel as though a woman's right to
reproduce and her ri~ht to bodily integrity attach only at the onset of
physical pregnancy. 28
Pregnancy, denied to infertile women,
becomes the "gatekeeper for reproductive rights. ,,229 In order to
avoid this discrimination against infertile women, courts should view
pregnancy as a process that encompasses not only the physiological
side of pregnancy,230 but all the myriad aspects of pregnancy,
including the preembryo stage. 231 In this way, infertile women will
be afforded the same rights to privacy and reproduction as fertile
women, and they will have "equal access to procreational
autonomy.,,232
Additional support for the argument that infertile women, and men,
should be afforded equal access to procreational autonomy can be
found in the landmark case Bragdon v. Abbott. 233 In Bragdon, the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the ability to
reproduce was a "ma~or life activity" as defined under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. 34 With regard to that issue, the Court held:
We have little difficulty concluding that [reproduction is a
major life activity]. As the [United States] Court of
Appeals[, First Circuit] held, "[t]he plain meaning of the
word 'major' denotes comparative importance" and
"suggest[s] that the touchstone for determining an activity's
inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance."
Reproduction falls well within the phrase "major life
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See Brown, supra note 148, at 103.
See id. The author notes that the Kass decision, although advancing gender equality,
did so at the expense of infertile women. Id.
!d. at 100-01; see also Daar, supra note 175, at 465 (noting that a pregnant woman
has the right to control her embryo based on the protection offered by Roe v. Wade,
whereas a woman undergoing ART does not). A woman with embryos in storage
will lose control over her embryos over the objection of the male partner because the
courts title the right not to procreate a compelling state interest. Id.
Daar, supra note 175, at 458.
Id. at 462.
Id.
[d. at 465.
524 U.S. 624 (1998).
Id. at 638-41.
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activity."
Reproduction and the sexual dynamics
surrounding it are central to the life process itself. 235
Although the case does not address the issue of infertility directly,
by analogy the infertile person, like the HIV -positive patient who
cannot procreate due to her ~hysical limitations, should be included
in the purview of the ADA. 23
Another way to provide equal protection to infertile women is to
cease viewing differently the ri~hts surrounding "coital reproduction"
and "noncoital reproduction." 37 Fundamental rights would then
attach to the individual with frozen embryos in storage in the same
way ther attach to a pregnant female or a person desiring to use birth
control. 38 If the fundamental rights afforded pregnant women were
also given to infertile persons, the state could not interfere with their
choice to utilize frozen embryos to achieve pregnancy.239 Any rule
that prevented an infertile person from achieving ~regnancy with her
frozen embryos would be subject to strict scrutiny. 40

C.

The Fallacy of the "Right Not to Parent" Argument

A common thread among judicial decisions in embryo disposition
cases is the right to avoid unwanted parenthood. 241 This "judicial
presumption" asserts that the spouse who opposes use of the embryos
will automatically be psychologically connected to any resulting
offspring based solely on their biological connection. 242 The result
for the unwilling parent, courts feel, is one of two options: either the
235.
236.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

242.

[d. at 638 (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107
F.3d 934, 939-40 (1997)).
Kevin Yamamoto & Shelby A. D. Moore, A Trust Analysis of a Gestational
Carrier's Right to Abortion, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 102 n.38 (2001) (noting that
Bragdon indicates that infertility might be covered by the ADA).
Daar, supra note 175, at 463-64.
See id.
See id. at 464-65.
See id.
See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051,1057-58 (Mass. 2000) (refusing, as a matter
of public policy, to enforce an embryo disposition agreement that would force an
unwilling husband to become a father); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001)
(arguing that the fundamental right not to procreate meant refusing to force an
unwilling woman into biological parenthood through donation of her embryos);
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that the right to procreate
and the right to avoid procreation were of equal significance in deciding on the
disposition of embryos). For a full discussion of these cases, see supra Parts II.B.I,
II.C.1.
Waldman, supra note 28, at 1027.
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parent will feel forced to create a relationship with the child, which
will thereby be at the parent's own psychological and emotional cost,
or the parent will reject the child and experience "a permanent and
agonal sense of 10ss.,,243
This presumption is easily rebutted, however, with current studies
on sperm donation and the modem fatherless family.244 Studies have
found that the majority of sperm donors are little concerned with the
end result of their donations, even with the strong possibility that the
end result is a biologically-related child. 245 These findings would
indicate that biology alone does not create paternal ties. 246
There is an acknowledged difference between anonymous sperm
donors and spouses who enter into the ART process with the hope of
conceiving a child. 247 Studies show, however, that even when
children are created willingly, biological ties are not indicative of
parental attachment. 248 These studies reveal that when parents and
children are separated by distance, and when parents are no longer in
a romantic relationship with one another, bonds between parents and
their biological offspring are minimal at best. 249 These studies reveal
that parental attachment is "socially enacted" and not biological;
therefore, as biology should not be the basis for rendering judicial
decisions. 25o
It is ironic that, whereas courts will enact the "unwilling parent"
analysis when rendering decisions regarding the use of frozen
embryos, these same courts disregard this notion if a party becomes
an unwilling parent through intercourse. 251
For example, in L. Pamela P. v. Frank s., 252 a man was held to be
responsible for the welfare of a child created by a sexual relationship
with the mother, even though the mother lied about her use of
contraception. 253 The court held that although the respondent had the
"constitutionally protected right" to make a choice regarding
becoming a father, that right extended to preventing state interference
in whether or not a person chooses to use birth control. 254 The court
243.
244.
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254.

Id. at 1027-28.
See id. at 1028, 1040--41, 1049.
See id. at 1049-51.
See id. at 1028-29.
See id. at 1052.
See id. at 1041-49.
See id. at 1041-45.
See id. at 1041-49.
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,603-04 (Tenn. 1992).
449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983).
See id. at 716.
Id. at 715-16.
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declined to extend the constitutional protection to include how people
related privately with one another and the conduct in which they
chose to engage. 255
This decision, which is still good law, seems counter to the rulings
in the frozen embryo dispute cases in that it clearly does not give a
parent, even one who is deceived into becoming a parent, the right
not to be one. 256 Current family law states that "[ e]ven if a father
[does] not consent to the conception or the gestation of the child," he
still must take on the responsibilities of fatherhood. 257 By contrast, at
common law, a father was not required to assume the responsibilities
of his offspring even though a mother was required to assume such
responsibilities. 258 At common law, therefore, an unwilling father,
like the parties in modem frozen embryo cases, had the right "not to
parent" if he so pleased. 259 It would appear that the modem judicial
approach encompassing the "right not to parent," then, is antiquated
and gender-biased.
When justifying the use of the right not to parent analysis, some
courts have invoked the spirit of a woman's right to have an
abortion. 260 Arguably, when a woman is given the right to end her
pregnancy, she is awarded the right not to parent. 261 Proponents of
the right not to parent theory feel that if an embryo may be implanted
against a male partner's wishes, then the female's rights become
superior, and thus gender bias is born. 262
The converse argument, however, is that Roe v. Wade encompasses
a woman's right to bodily integrity, and fails to address her right not
to be a parent. 263 As one scholar states:
[T]he fact that these burdens [associated with bearing an
unwanted child] may be overcome by the interests of the
state, which has no biological connection or presumed
obligation to support the unwanted child, suggests that, apart
from doing as she chooses with her own body, a woman has
little, if any, right not to be a parent. 264
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Jd. at 716.
See id. at 714-16.
Pachman, supra note 202, at 143.
Jd. at 143-44.
See id. at 143.
See id. at 144-45.
See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1401-02.
Pachman, supra note 202, at 144.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Even though courts nationwide have used varied approaches in
their analyses of frozen embryo dispute resolution, none have
addressed the particular needs of the party who is at the most
disadvantage-the infertile patient. Most often this is the female
whose ability to procreate may not only be limited by medical
reasons, but by the simple virtue of her narrow window of time for
reproduction.
The current application of the contractual theory gives little weight
to the physical and emotional stress patients are under when signing
convoluted embryo agreements that will alter the rest of the patient's
life. Likewise, the balancing/best interest test, though gender neutral
on the surface, is riddled with gender bias against women, and in
particular infertile women.
It is vital that Maryland adopt an equitable judicial framework for
resolving embryo disposition disputes so that when cases inevitably
end up in Maryland's courtrooms for resolution, guidance is available
to aid in rendering truly fair results.
Melissa Boatman

